A study was performed to evaluate the reliability of Integrated Modular Engine (IME) concepts. Comparisons were made between networked IME systems and non-networked discrete systems using expander cycle configurations. Both redundant and nonredundant systems were analyzed. Binomial approximation and Markov analysis techniques were employed to evaluate total system reliability. In addition, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were performed to allow detailed evaluation of the IME concept.
Introduction
Integrated Modular Engine (IME) designs are currently being considered for use in various space propulsion applications) 4 Conventional nonnetworked, or discrete, engines are designed such that each engine system is a standalone unit. In the discrete system, if a turbopump fails the corresponding thrust chamber must also be shut down. In the networked, or modular, engine concept, however, all turbopump assemblies and thrust chamber assemblies are joined by common manifolds.
In this system, therefore, a turbopump or thrust chamber could be shut down independently should a failure occur in either component. Therefore, the IME offers potential advantages of increased fault tolerance and reliability when compared to discrete systems. The purpose of this report is to evaluate and compare the reliability of the IME and the discrete engine systems, to determine the reliability drivers of the IME, and to conduct a sensitivity study of the effects of component failures on system reliability of the IME.
Both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used to evaluate the IME reliability. The quantitative analyses consisted of binomial and Markov analyses. A binomial approximation technique was employed to characterize the reliability of the system based on component shutdown probabilities.
Markov techniques
were also used to evaluate the effects of engine burn duration on system reliability based on component failure rates. Because of the large uncertainty in the available component reliability data, the emphasis of the binomial approximation and Markov analyses was to conduct relative comparisons between modular and discrete systems, rather than to obtain absolute failure data.
The qualitative techniques included Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA), Preliminary
Hazard Analyses (PHA), and Fault Tree Analyses (FTA). An FMEA was conducted for the IME to determine the effects of single-point failures on the system. A PHA was used to identify potential hazards associated with the operation of the IME. Finally, an FTA was prepared to assist in the characterization of system-wide failures.
System Description
An Integrated Modular Engine system schematic is provided in Fig. 1 . This design is based on a NASA Lewis Research Center effort to examine the IME concept and to determine methods of physically assembling such a system _. In this IME design an expander cycle configuration was used. As a baseline, eight thrust chamber assemblies are connected with four fuel and four oxygen turbopump assemblies.
Five manifolds are required in this design to connect the thrust chambers and the turbopumps. Shutoff valves are used to isolate the pumps, turbines, and the thrust chambers in the event of a degradation of any of these compo-wereused to evaluate the reliability of the IME, including binomial approximation, Markov analysis, FMEA, PHA, and fault trees. A description of each process is included, and results for the above system configuration are provided for each of the techniques.
Binomial Approximation
In the binomial approximation technique, also known as the k-out-of-N modeling technique, it is assumed that k components out of a total of N components must operate for the entire system to perform successfully. Therefore, the technique applies only to cases where redundancy is used. The following equation is used in the binomial approximation analysis of redundant systems: 6 To analyze the IME system with redundancy, the reliability of each subsystem (fuel pump, oxidizer pump, fuel turbine, oxidizer turbine, thrust chamber) was obtained by multiplying the reliabilities of the components in each redundant subsystem (components in series). The total subsystem reliability was then obtained by using the binomial equation for the parallel subsystems. For instance, for the fuel turbopumps, k = 3 and N=4 for the baseline case. The total system reliability was then obtained by multiplying the total subsystem reliabilities. For the discrete system the reliability of each engine was obtained by multiplying the reliabilities of each component. The binomial approximation was then used to obtain total system reliability (k = 7, N= 8 for the baseline case) for the parallel engine systems.
For the cases without redundancy, the part reliabilities can be multiplied to obtain a total system reliability, ReToua. The total system failure probability is calculated in either case as 1.0-PrToml. Tables I and II provide lists of components  and  their estimated failure rates for the IME and is assumed that the remaining turbopumps can meet the power requirement with no change in their reliability). Therefore, the failure rates were constant and independent of the number of components functioning.
4. The health monitoring system can identify and respond to a problem 100 percent of the time.
5. No common cause failures were included.
6. Sensor and controller reliabilities were not included in the analysis.
7. If a turbine (pump) failed on either the oxygen or hydrogen circuit the corresponding pump (turbine) would be deactivated,
8. Loss of a turbine bypass valve will lead to IME system loss (bypass simultaneously affects all turbines and adverse effects cannot be mitigated).
The binomial analysis was performed over a range of 2 to 12 thrusters. For the IME the number of turbopump assemblies was half the number of thrust chamber assemblies in each case. In addition, in the cases without redundancy the IME design did not include the isolation and check valves for the turbomachinery or for the nozzle coolant channel. These isolation and check valves would only be required for component isolation after failure; in the case without redundancy any component failure will cause total system failure and isolation would not be not necessary.
The results of the binomial approximation analysis are shown in Figs. 3 to 6. Figure 3 compares the reliability of the IME with that of the discrete system for systems with 2 to 12 thrust chambers and where no redundancy is available (i.e., all components must operate). From the figure it can be seen that the discrete systems showed higher reliabilities than the IME systems for cases with less than six thrust chambers. For six thrust chambers and higher the IME proved to be more reliable than the discrete system. At low numbers of thrust chambers the manifold failure probability causes the IME system reliability to be reduced in comparison to the discrete system. As the number of thrust chambers is increased, the turbomachinery becomes a more important factor in the total system reliability. Because the IME has fewer turbopumps than the discrete system, the IME becomes more reliable than the discrete system as the number of thrust chambers and turbopump assemblies is increased. that redundancy provides a significant benefit for both systems. Redundancy increases reliability by routing component failure to other operating components. As can be seen by Fig. 4 , the discrete system showed higher system reliabilities when compared to the IME. The discrete system showed reliabilities between 0.99998 and 0.99975 for 4 to 12 thrusters. These reliabilities corresponded to total system failure rates of 0.02 to 0.25 per 1000 firings. In contrast, the IME had reliabilities which varied from 0.99789 to 0.99773, or failure rates of 2.11 to 2.27 per 1000 firings. Therefore, the system failure rates for the IME were approximately one order of magnitude higher than the discrete system.
From preliminary reliability studies not included in this report it appears that the reliability drivers are the valves and the manifolds, specifically because the turbine bypass valves and the manifolds represent the potential for single point failures. Therefore, sensitivity studies were performed on the reliabilities associated with these components. Figure 5 shows the effect of valve shutdown rate on system reliability for both the discrete and IME systems with eight thrust chamber assemblies. The valve failure rate (shutdown rate) was varied from 0 to 0.5 per 1000 firings. From the figure it can be seen that, even if the valves had a shutdown rate of 0 (100 percent reliability), the IME showed lower reliabilities than the discrete system. Because the turbine bypass valve represents a single point failure under the assumptions given previously, the analysis was also performed allowing redundancy in the bypass valves. Again, the discrete system showed higher reliabilities than the IME, but the reliability of both the discrete and IME systems did improve with the addition of redundancy. It should be noted that, because of the uncertainty tn whether the loss of turbine bypass valves cause system failure, further analyses are required to determine the dependence of the system on these valves.
However, this figure illustrates that, although the valve failure rate can affect the total system reliability, the valves do not appear to be the reason for reduced IME reliability in comparison to the discrete engine system. Figure 6 shows the effect of manifold failure rate on total system reliability. From the figure it can be seen that the discrete engine concept provides higher reliabilities when compared to the IME concept except when manifold reliability was high and the turbine bypass valves were assumed to be redundant. The discrete system showed no change because no manifolds were assumed in this system. Examination of the design in Fig. 1 shows that the manifolds represent a single point failure, where loss of a manifold results in loss of the system. The manifolds would include the connections from the component piping (flanges, fasteners, etc.) as well as the ducting itself. Therefore, because the manifold has been shown to be the key reliability driver, it may be necessary to focus future efforts in IME design on manifold reliability, including connections, for the IME concept to achieve reliabilities similar to that of the discrete system.
The results of the binomial analysis show the significant improvement in system reliability derived from redundancy. Discrete systems increase reliability by isolating failures to the singular unit and reducing dependence on shared components, such as manifolds.
Therefore, based on this analysis, the real reliability issue is not redundancy but the actual system design.
Markov analysis techniques are useful tools in the reliability modeling of stochastic systems. 6'7 To this end, a time-homogeneous Markov process with finite state space was used to compare the time-dependent reliability of IME and discrete engine system designs.
Recording the degradation of system reliability with time proves useful in defining system operation envelopes based on demanded reliability and component fail- The results of this type of analysis are insightful. As time progresses during system operation, the probability of system failure is determined by the rate at which its individual components fail and how their failure will impact the system. Increases in system failure probability during each successive time interval establishes a failure probability distribution. This probability distribution documents the temporal increase in system failure probability, and its difference from unity at each time step defines the system reliability Resys. Similarly, the mean time to failure (MT1Ts) (i.e., the expected time to system failure) may be determined from the distribution.
Unless noted otherwise, component failure rates were from reference 4 and are listed in Tables I and   II 4. System failure was assumed to occur when the system can no longer provide 100 percent thrust. IME system failure was defined as greater than one failed liquid oxygen turbopump assembly, greater than one failed liquid hydrogen turbopump assembly, greater than four shutdown thrust chamber assemblies (i.e., greater than two failed overall), and instantaneous failure with the single-point failures. Discrete system failure was defined as greater than four failed engines. Figure 8 graphs the temporal decay of reliability of IME and discrete systems. At all system firing times, the discrete engine system had higher reliability than the IME system. The IME system demonstrated a 899-second M'ITF s in comparison to the discrete system with a 1964-second M'ITF s. The reduced mean time to system failure of the IME was the result of, in part, system sensitivity of single point failures (manifolds, turbine bypass valves) and, in part, the intrinsically higher dependence of system operation on a smaller number of components. Likewise, at a demanded 99 percent reliability level, the discrete system could operate for 470 seconds longer than the IME system, from 500 seconds (discrete) to 30 seconds (IME). The capability of calculating acceptable firing durations based on component failure rates and demanded system reliability demonstrates the merit of the Marker analysis technique.
The IME system was found to be vulnerable to single point failures by the binomial analysis. Hence, the effect of assumed single point failure probability on IME system reliability was investigated by assuming failure-free (100 percent reliability) manifolds and turbine bypass valves (TBPVs) using Markov. System reliability improved as shown in Fig. 9 . A dramatic improvement of 377 percent was achieved in firing duration (30 to 143 seconds) at 99 percent reliability when manifold/TBPV reliability is set to 1.0. Improvements in system firing time tapered off at lower reliability levels, indicating a decreasing importance of single-point failures with time. This point is expanded further subsequently.
Note that these increases in fu'ing duration, however large, were still less than the predicted firing durations of the discrete systems at all reliability levels.
Clearly, total system reliability is dependent on each component's failure rate. When a system's sensitivity to these rates is established, critical components that dictate system reliability are identified for reliability enhancement.
A constant failure rate (0.0003 failures/ second) was imposed on all system components as a baseline. Each component's failure rate was then systematically doubled, and the resulting system reliability was compared with the baseline case.
With the noted exception of the manifolds/ TBPVs at a reliability level greater than 94 percent for the IME system, the turbopumps were the most critical components in determining reliability for all systems (discrete, IME). Figure 10 illustrates the reliability curve crossover of the manifold/TBPV with both the turbopumps and thrust chambers for the IME system. This crossover was due to both a faster rise and larger spread in the distribution of system failure probability due to doubling the manifold/'rBPV failure rate. Also, the failure of thrust chamber assemblies was more significant for a discrete system than an IME system at the 99 percent reliability level. Firing durations decreased by 25 percent (247 to 186 seconds) in comparison to 3 percent (31 to 30 seconds) for the IME system. The results confirm the obvious fact that increasing component failure rates decrease system reliability. degrading reliability of the IME system. For example, system reliability decreased approximately 13 percent for a 500-second firing duration. This reliability decline increases with increasing firing duration until the system fails with 100 percent probability at approximately 1300 seconds. An FMEA was performed on the IME to identify component failure modes and their effects on the IME. Table III 1. The pictorial display of the system provides insights into the failure consequence chains.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
2. The relative effects of contributing factors to failure of the system can be identified quantitatively, 3. The weak points in the system can be quantitatively identified.
4. The vulnerability of the system to common cause failures can be readily identified.
Limitations to using a fault tree are that the analyst may not include all failure possibilities (errors of exclusion), there may be large uncertainty in the failure rate data, and the process can be extremely time-consuming. However, probabilistic techniques, including fault tree analyses, have been useful in assessing risk in many NASA applications. 14 Figure 12 shows a sample page from the IME fault tree, The fault tree was prepared at NASA Lewis
Research Center using the IRRAS code. IRRAS is a model developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the performance of probabilistic risk assessments. 15 (The symbols used in the figure are defined in In the nuclear industry, both reactor operating experience and PRA results consistently indicate that these common cause failures are major contributors to accidents. 12 Reference 16 states that propulsion systems are inherently vulnerable to correlated (common cause) failures due to their high energy. Therefore, further efforts using quantitative probabilistic risk assessment techniques are required to determine the impact of common cause on the IME.
A study was conducted to evaluate the reliability of IME concepts. The reliability of the IME was compared to that of discrete engines using an expander cycle configuration.
Binomial Analysis weredeveloped fortheME to determine the critical parameters and high risk components in the IME.
The results from the binomial approximation analysis showed quantitatively that the manifolds are the key reliability driver in the IME, and that the IME requires low probability of manifold failure for the concept to show benefit compared to discrete systems.
Therefore, from the analysis the IME will be a less reliable engine system than the discrete system in most cases, based on the assumptions and techniques used here. These results were confirmed by the Marker analysis. In addition, the Marker analysis showed that the IME had a lower mean time to system failure and a lower median failure time than the discrete engine system. The results of the Marker and binomial approximation techniques clearly show a significant improvement in system reliability derived from redundancy and designing rocket systems using independent engine units. Redundancy increases reliability by routing component failure to other operating components.
Discrete engine systems increase reliability by isolating failures to the singular unit and reducing the dependence of engine functionality on shared components such as manifolds. Hence, based on this analysis, the real reliability issue is not redundancy but system integration (the system design itself). These analyses were performed on the basis of eight thrust chambers. Future systems may actually require fewer thrust chambers, depending on the mission chosen. Although the trends will be similar for fewer thrusters, future reliability studies will be required once the actual engine configuration is defined.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis techniques were also used to assess the reliability of the Integrated Modular Engine concepts. All three techniques are necessary for a complete evaluation of a rocket engine system design. Future efforts should concentrate on quantitative fault tree analysis tradeoffs to improve the reliability of the IME, or any other rocket propulsion system considered for space applications.
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Figure 6.-Effect of manifold shutdown rate on system reliability, one thrust chamber out, one turbopump out'. Firing duration, sec Figure 11 .-Health monitoring effect on IME system reliability. 
